

Message Text

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ACTION IO-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4280

INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 1848

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, PFOR, BR

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: DEPT'S ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES AND
OBJECTIVES; REQUEST FOR MULTILATERAL INFORMATION ON HOSTS GOVERNMENTS

REF: STATE 037591

SUMMARY: BRAZIL'S PRIMARY MULTI-LATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE, WITH A VIEW TO
FAVORING THE LDC'S WHILE TRYING TO AVOID POSITIONS OF DIRECT
CONFRONTATION WITH DC INTERESTS. MULTI-LATERAL POLITICAL
ISSUES TEND TO BE SUBORDINATE, AND BRAZIL'S BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-
LATERAL FORUMS NOW EVINCES DECLINING CONCERNS ABOUT THE
BROADER SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN WORLD.
DURING 1976 WE EXPECT TO SEE CONTINUED TREND TOWARD THRID
WORLD IDENTIFICATION, AND PRIMARY CONCERN WITH INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ISSUES, INCLUDING BRAZILIAN PROPOSAL FOR OVERARCHING
NORTH-SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENT, CIEC AND MTN, AND LOS. WITHIN
CONTEXT OF DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS BRAZIL
REMAINS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFLUENCE OF ARAB STATES AND OPEC,
BLACK AFRICAN STATES, AND FELLOW LATIN AMERICANS. BRAZILIAN
DELEGATION TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINS ARE FULLY AND
CAREFULLY INSTRUCTED, IT APPEARS THEIR REPORTING IS
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USUALLY SUFFICIENT AND TIMELY: IN SOME CASE, HOWEVER,

MINISTRY HAS APPARENTLY BEEN CAUGHT UNAWARE. MINISTRY IS NORMALLY OPEN TO US REPRESENTATION ON MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES, BUT VOTING RECORD OF LAST YEAR SHOWS DEVELOPING DIVERGENCE FROM US ON MAJOR ISSUES. CONCEPT THAT OUR INTERACTION ON MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES IS PART OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IS NOT FULLY ACCEPTED BY BRAZILIANS. BRAZIL REARELY SOLICITS US SUPPORTS (AT LEAST THROUGH EMBASSY) ON MULTI-LATERAL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE OR ON ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. BRAZIL PARTICIPATES ACTIVELY IN FULL ARRAY OF MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL BODIES, UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, AND IN CONFERENCES ON SPECIALIZED THEMES HELD UNDER THEIR AUSPICES. IN VIEW OF THE LARGE NUMBER AND VARIETY OF THESE FORUMS AND DIVERSITY OF BRAZILIAN INTERESTS, COMPLETE SYNOPTIC ANALYSIS WOULD REQUIRE STUDY BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS MESSAGE (AS PARA 6 OF REFTEL ACKNOWLEDGES). WE CAN, HOWEVER, OFFER FOLLOWING GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT BRAZIL'S MULTILATERAL ROLE AND ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY UNDERLYING TRENDS IN ITS BEHAVIOR AND PARTICULAR INTERESTS IT MAY PURSUE IN COMING MONTHS.

2. BRAZIL HAS HIGH QUALITY PROFESSIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATES ACTIVELY AND COMPETENTLY IN MOST MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL FORUMS THROUGH, IN MOST CASES, NOT AGGRESSIVELY. NORMALLY, BRAZILIANS ARE RELUCTANT TO LAUNCH MAJOR INITIATIVES OR TO GET TOO FAR OUT IN FRONT ON HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. PARTICULARLY MARKED IN REGIONAL CONTEXT IS BRAZILIAN HESITANCE TO TAKE ACTION THAT MIGHT BE SEEN BY SMALLER HEMISPHERIC NEIGHBORS AS ATTEMPT TO THROW ITS WEIGHT AROUND OR ARROGATE TO ITSELF ROLE OF REGIONAL LEADER.

3. WE EXPECT THAT DURING 1976, BRAZIL'S PRIMARY MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES WILL AGIN FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE. BRAZIL MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO PLAY RELATIVELY ACTIVE ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS WHEREIN ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF "NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE" ARE CONDUCTED, AND TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FAR-REACHING REFORMS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER TO ADVANTAGE OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. BRAZIL'S MULTILATERAL STRATEGY WILL BE TO PROMOTE MEASURES THAT WILL FACILITATE THE FLOW OF CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY ON FAVORABLE TERMS FROM THE

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DEVELOPED TO THE LESS DEVELOPED AND BROADEN EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES OF LDC'S IN MAJOR WORLD MARKETS. THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE SPECIAL CONGENY FOR BRAZIL AS A MORE ADVANCED DEVELOPING COUNTRY, HUNGRY FOR CAPITAL AND EXPROT-ORIENTED, AND IN RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION TO ABSORB AND BENEFIT FROM MORE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY. ALTHOUGH BRAZIL DEMONSTRATES SOLIDARITY WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS A GROUP, THE PRAGMATIC PURSUIT OF ITS OWN ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS LEADS THE GOB GENERALLY TO ADOPT

AN ATTITUDE OF DISINTEREST ABOUT SPECIAL MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED.

4. WHILE BRAZIL, OF COURSE, IS DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF THE WEST FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS ASPIRATIONS FOR RAPID DEVELOPMENT, IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS IT TENDS INCREASINGLY TO ADOPT AN ADVERSARIAL POSITION TOWARD THEM AND TO MAXIMIZE ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE THIRD WORLD AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING ITS BARGAINING POWER FOR ECONOMIC AND TRADE CONCESSIONS. AT SAME TIME, AS CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY WITH FREE MARKET ECONOMY SEEKING FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, BRAZIL TENDS TO ESCHUE MORE EXTREME AND DEMAGOGIC THIRD-WORLD POSITIONS AND TRIES TO AVOID POSITIONS OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRY INTERESTS.

5. IN THIS SCHEME OF PRIORITIES, BRAZIL TENDS TO SUBORDINATE MOST MULTILATERAL POLITICAL ISSUES TO BROADER ECONOMIC STRATEGY. PAST YEAR SHOWED A CONTINUING TREND TOWARD BRAZILIAN PRACTICE OF CONSENSUS POLITICS ON MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS AS MEANS OF ESTABLISHING ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE THIRD WORLD AND PURSUING POSSIBLE TRADE-OFFS FOR ISSUES OF MORE IMMEDIACY. BRAZIL CONTINUES TO CLAIM TO BELONG TO "WESTERN WORLD", THOUGH IN A GREATLY BROADENED SENSE, INCLUDING IN THE TERM FOR EXAMPLE, THE PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING COUNTRIES OF AFRICA WITH WHICH BRAZIL SEEKS SPECIAL TIES. HOWEVER, BRAZIL'S BEHAVIOR IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS NOW EVINCES DECLINING CONCERN ABOUT THE BROADER SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, PARTICULARLY IF THE AREAS OF CONFLICT ARE REMOTE FROM BRAZIL OR HAVE NEVER BEEN PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF BRAZILIAN CONCERN. EXAMPLES OF THIS ATTITUDE WERE BRAZILIAN UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT U.S. ON KOREAN RESOLUTION IN 1975 UNGA, AND ON GUAM AND GENERAL DECOLONIZATION RESOLUTIONS INCLUDING CONDEMNATIONS OF NATIO. BRAZIL'S ABSTENTION ON THE HOSTILE KOREAN

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RESOLUTION LAST FALL WAS AN ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN ITS CONSISTENT SUPPORT UNTIL THEN OF U.S. POSITIONS ON ALL EAST-WEST ISSUES. WITH IDEOLOGY PLAYING DWINDLING ROLE IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INCREASING BRAZILIAN COMPLACENCY ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES, BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CHOICES IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS TEND TO BE INCREASINGLY TACTICAL OR EVEN OPPORTUNISTIC. BRAZIL'S VOTE IN 30TH UNGA TO CONDEMN ZIONISM WAS TACTICAL DECISION--ADMITTED AS SUCH AFTERWARD--TO WIN FAVOR OF ARAB BLOC FOR GUARANTEED PETROLEUM SUPPLY, EXPORT MARKETS, AND POSSIBLE CREDITS, AND TO IDENTIFY BRAZIL WITH BROAD THIRD-WORLD CONSENSUS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BRASILIA 1848

6. IN SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO QUESTION A IN REFTTEL, DURING 1976
WE EXPECT TO SEE CONTINUED TREND TOWARD THIRD-WORLD IDENTIFICATION,
AND PRIMARY CONCERN WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES:

A - CONTINUED BRAZILIAN EFFORTS TO SEEK SOME MEANS OF ADVANCING
ITS PROPOSAL ADVANCED AT TH 7TH UN SPECIAL SESSION FOR AN
OVER-ARCHING NORTH-SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENT (OR FOR OTHR DEVELOPING
COUNTRY PROPOSALS OF SIMILAR NATURE).

B - CONTINUED INTEREST IN FULL PARTICIPATION, THOUGH OFTEN WITH
LOW PROFILE, IN UNCTAD AND THE GOUNP O 77, IN CIEC AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS.

C - BRAZIL, WITH AN EIGHT-THOUSAND MILE COASTLINE AND A CLAIMED
TWO-HUNDRED MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, HAV BEEN MAJOR INTERESTED
PARTY AND ACTOR IN LAW OF LOS CONFERENCE. WE EXPECT CONTINUED
ACTIVE BRAZILIAN ROLE, POSSILY WITH GREATER EMPASIS ON EFFORTS
TO FIND COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENTS ON SUCH MATTERS AS DEEP SEABEDS,
BETWEEN OPPOSED INTERESTS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
BECAUE OF IS ONGOING DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA OVER ITS PLAS FOR
UTILIZING THE WATERS OF THE PAANA RIVERS, ?4-"8) 28)) -) 9 -.8,5-8,
A STRON INTEREST IN MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING CONTRO
OF WATER RESOURCES.

D - ON INTERNATINAL ECONOMIC ISSUES IN REGIONAL FORUMS
SUCH AS OAS AND SELA, WE EXPECT BRAZIL TO CONTINUE TAKING
RELATIVELY PRAGMATIC OR EVEN CONSERVATIVE APPROACH ON SUCH ISSUES
AS CONTROLS ON MUJTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, RIGHTS OF FOREIGN
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INVESTORS, AND COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO STEER AWAY FROM LATAM-U.S. CONFRONTATIONS, BRAZIL WILL ALSO WISH TO AVOID ENDING UP IN A SMALL MINORITY OPPOSED TO THE GENERAL LATAM POSITION.

E - WHILE BRAZIL HAS NO MAJOR POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF ITS OWN AT THIS TIME TO PUSH IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, WE CAN EXPECT THAT THEY WILL MANEUVER VIGOROUSLY IN THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND ELSEWHERE TO BLOCK ANY MOVES TO CENSURE BRAZIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. BRAZILIANS ALREADY EMBARKED ON SPECIAL EFFORT TO HAVE PENDING UN HRC REPORT ON ABUSES IN BRAZIL SHELVED.

F - ON MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES IN UNGA INVOLVING FOR EXAMPLE DECOLONIZATION AND MIDDLE EAST, BRAZIL WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO STRONG ATTRACTION TO GO ALONG WITH THIRD-WORLD CONSENSUS. THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR ON ISSUES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO US LIKE PUERTO RICO, PANAMA, AND KOREA IS PROBABLY UNENTHUSIASTIC OR EVEN GRUDING SUPPORT. FURTHER CONDEMNATORY MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA, AND RHODESIA AS WELL AS REFERENCES TO NATO IMPERIALISM WILL PROBABLY GET BRAZILIAN SUPPORT. STRONG CONSIDERATION FOR BRAZILIANS IN THIS GENERAL AREA WILL BE THEIR HOPES FOR SPECIAL ROLE IN AFRICA THROUGH PORTUGUESE-TERRITORIES CONNECTION.

7. CONCERNING QUESTION B ABOUT INFLUENCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES ON BRAZILIAN POSITIONS, AS INDICATED ABOVE, DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIRD-WORLD CREDENTIALS IS NOW MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN BRAZIL'S MULTILATERAL POLICY-MAKING. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, BRAZIL REMAINS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFLUENCE OF 1) ARAB STATES AND OPEC; 2) BLACK AFRICAN STATES, PARTICULARLY FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES WITH WHOM BRAZIL SEEKING TO ESTABLISH SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP; AND 3) FELLOW LATIN AMERICANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FREQUENT OR SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE AMONG THESE GROUPINGS, ALTHOUGH BRAZIL DOES, OF COURSE, SEEK TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THESE STATES, PARTICULARLY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, AND PROBABLY MAKES ITS POSITION OR PREFERENCES KNOWN. MORE OFTEN BRAZIL ALLOWS OTHERS TO TAKE LEAD AND SEEKS TO ADJUST ITSELF TO BROADER CONSENSUS. INDICATIONS IN PAST HAVE BEEN THAT SIGNS OF ESTABLISHED OR BURGEONING MAJORITY ON GIVEN ISSUE HAVE CONSIDERABLE "BANDWAGON EFFECT" ON FOREIGN MINISTRY DECISION FORMULATION. THAT IS, IN SOME CASES, AT LEAST, HOW MANY COUNTS AS MUCH AS WHO.

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8. CONCERNING QUESTION C, BRAZIL FULLY AND CAREFULLY INSTRUCTS ITS DELEGATES TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND RETAINS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THEM WHILE MEETINGS ARE IN PROGRESS. INFORMATION READING US SUGGESTS THAT THE REPORTING OF BRAZILIAN DELEGATES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES IS PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT TIMELY AND

REALISTSIC INSTRUCTIONS BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. ON OCCASION, HOWEVER, WHEN WE ARE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK BRAZIL'S VIES ON A RELATIVELY OBSCURE OR (TO BRAZIL) MONOR UPCOMING ISSUE (EG. GUAM), WE FIND ITAMARATY UNIFORED AND WITHOUT A POSTION. THIS IS PROBABLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE EXTREME RANGE AND DEPTH OF OUR MULTILATERAL INTERESTS IN COMPARISON TO THEIRS. IT IS ALSO WORHT NOTING THAT ONE EXPLANATION GIVEN FOR THE BRAZILIAN VOTE ON ZIONISM WAS THAT IT CAUGHT THE BRAZILIAN GELEGATION AND ITAMARATY UNAWARE AND WITHOUT TIME FOR CAREFUL DELIBARATION (AS APPARENTLY WAS THE CASE WITH MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS). IN FACT, WE HAVE HEARD HIGH-LEVEL COMPLAINTS ABOUT RESOLUTIONS BEING FORFCD IN THE UN TO QUICK VOTES SO THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE ADEQUATE ANALYSIS TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

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INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

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9. ON QUESTION D, THERE ARE NO BRAZILIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OR HEADS OF DELEGATIONS NOW ASSIGNED WHO HAVE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL INDEPENDENT POLITICAL POWER WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH EFFECTVE CONTROL BY THE GOVERNMENT. BRAZILIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT SUCH POSTS ACRE AS A RULE DISCIPLINED CAREER PROFESSIONALS.

10. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY IS NORMALLY OPEN AN RECEPTIVE-- THROUGH NOT NECESSARILY RESPONSIVE-- TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. IN GENERAL, WE HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO

PRESENT OUR POSITIONS FULLY AND FAIRLY AT ALL LEVELS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, AND WE BELIEVE THAT OUR DEMARCHES HAVE A LEAST NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER IGNORED IN FINAL DECISION. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS CUSTOMARY RECEPTIVITY WAS OUR STRONG WRITTEN REPRESENTATION ON THE ZIONISM VOTE, A HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUE WITHIN BRAZIL. THE NOTE BROUGHT FORTH PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF ITAMARATY RESENTMENT AND THE SURPRISING CONTENTION IN UNATTRIBUTED REMARKS TO PRESS THAT REPRESENTATIONS OF THIS SORT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN A COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. VOTING RECORD OF LAST YEAR SHOWS DEVELOPING DIVERGENCE FROM US ON MAJOR ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE ON WHICH WE HAD MADE REPRESENTATIONS HERE AND/OR IN WASHINGTON, SUCH AS DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND GUAM AND ZIONISM, THE CONCEPT THAT OUR INTERACTION ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IS PART OF OUR BILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL

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RELATIONS IS NOT FULLY ACCEPTED BY THE BRAZILIANS. THEY ARE PROBABLY MORE INCLINED TO SEE U.S. CONCERNS FOR OR INTEREST IN SPECIFIC MULTILATERAL ISSUES AS COMPELLING WHEN THOSE MULTILATERAL ISSUES DIRECTLY RELATE TO AN IMMEDIATE U.S. INTEREST, ALTHOUGH EVEN IN SUCH CASES THEY MAY DECIDE FOR PRAGMATIC REASONS TO WITHHOLD SUPPORT. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE OCCASIONALLY MADE COMMENTS DEPLORING WHAT THEY SEE AS U.S. TENDENCY TO SEE BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENT VOTING ON SUCH ISSUES AS ZIONISM AS A VOTE "AGAINST" U.S. IN PRESS COMMENTS STIMULATED BY U.S. PROTEST NOTE TO BRAZIL ON ZIONISM VOTE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS TOOK POSITION THAT U.S. HAD ERRED BY INJECTING MULTILATERAL ISSUE INTO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BRAZIL RARELY SOLICITS U.S. SUPPORT (AT LEAST THROUGH EMBASSY) ON MULTILATERAL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE OR ON ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE FACT THAT THE STREET IS LARGELY ONE-WAY OF COURSE HAMPERS OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP BRAZILIAN RECEPTIVITY TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS. CRIMMINS

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